	1 beaches, crystal clear waters, and it's located on the
	2 South China Sea in the northern province of the
	3 Philippines. It's about 441 kilograms from Manila. Its
	4 main commodity is garlic; hence its known as the garlic
	5 centre of the north. Its inhabitants are known for
	6 their building skills in shipping.
	7 The other interesting thing about Sinait is that it
	8 houses the Miraculous Statue of the Black Nazarene, or
	9 El Santo Cristo Milagroso, locally known as Apo Lakay.
	10 In the year 1620, local fishermen from Sinait and
	another nearby village called Badoc found a black box
	floating in the sea with two statues: one of the Blessed
	13 Virgin Mary, the other of the Black Nazarene. According
	to legend, sir, the fishermen from Sinait were
	mysteriously unable to move the statue of the
	Blessed Mary, whereas the fishermen from Badoc were
	17 unable to move the statue of the Black Nazarene. So
	18 each group of fishermen carried the respective statues
	that they were able to carry back to their local
	20 villages. The Black Nazarene became the patron saint of
	21 Sinait.
	Apparently, in 1656, an epidemic was raging through
	Sinait, and it was said that, through the devotion of
	24 the faithful, many people got cured.
	25 Sir, just over 72 years ago, three weeks ago, on
	Page 35
1	1 24 November 1946, my client, Mr Elpido Bonifacio, was
2	born in Sinait. At the time, the population was 13,000.
3	3 On 14 June 2017, Mr Bonifacio was the last person taken
4	4 out of the Grenfell Tower at 8.08 am.
5	5 Mr Bonifacio resided in flat 83, which is on the
6	6 11th floor before the refurbishment, it was the 8th
7	7 floor where he lived with his wife, Rosita, for
8	8 36 years. Rosita is here today.
9 (11.05 am)	9 Because of disability, he was unable to
10 Closing submissions on behalf of G11 by MR THOMAS	10 self-evacuate. That night, his daughter-in-law made
11 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Now, Mr Thomas, you're going to	four frantic 999 calls on his behalf. Throughout the
12 address us next, I think.	night, into daylight, he moved backwards and forth from
13 MR THOMAS: I am.	the windows of one of the bedrooms, waving a towel,
Mr Chairman, the one thing that you and I can	waiting to be seen and to be rescued. With flames
probably agree on is that you haven't heard of Sinait?	15 engulfing the entire building in the early hours of
16 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: I'm sorry, I didn't hear what you	16 14 June, Mr Bonifacio prepared to die, like many of the
17 said.	17 other residents in Grenfell. His personal chronology of
18 MR THOMAS: Sinait.	18 waiting to die is harrowing. He believed his fate was
19 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: How do you spell it?	19 sealed.
20 MR THOMAS: S-I-N-A-I-T.	20 The image of Mr Bonifacio waving out the window was
21 SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: No.	21 picked up by heli-tele footage and, indeed, news
22 MR THOMAS: Okay. Well, let me tell you about Sinait.	footage, in which he appears to be a poignant figure in
23 In 2015, the local population of Sinait from	23 desperation, trapped inside Grenfell as dawn was
a census indicated the population was 25,000. Sinait is	24 breaking.
a small, picturesque fishing village, with white sand	25 Sir, Mr Bonifacio's oral testimony would have
Page 34	Page 36

1	provided this inquiry with a unique, powerful and	1	of the 1970s, he was part of the Gemini Sound System.
2	invaluable perspective.	2	Sir, a sound system is a system that comprises of
3	What is unique about Mr Bonifacio's survival and	3	a group of young DJs with their portable decks, powerful
4	what I have not yet revealed is that Mr Bonifacio was	4	speakers and amplifiers, who travel back and forth to
5	not only elderly, not only did he have frailties, but	5	play records that can be transported from venue to
6	Mr Bonifacio is blind. Yet this blind, frail, elderly	6	venue.
7	resident trapped in Grenfell survived and was the last	7	Raymond was in a long-term relationship with his
8	man out.	8	partner and companion, Karen, and they shared a dog
9	Now, I don't know whether the Black Nazarene, also	9	named Marley, apparently a King Charles spaniel. Both
10	known as El Santo Cristo Milagroso, or locally known as	10	Raymond and Karen loved Marley as if he were their only
11	Apo Lakay, was looking down on this blind, frail,	11	child.
12	elderly son of that fishing village known as Sinait, but	12	Raymond suffered with ill-health, severe arthritis,
13	he survived apparently against all the odds. He was	13	thus making his escape from the 21st floor of Grenfell
14	finally rescued by firefighters from flat 83 on the	14	impossible without assistance and a properly functioning
15	11th floor at 8.08 am.	15	in lift.
16	Sir, here is the thing: Mr Bonifacio wanted to	16	Sir, neither Raymond or Marley made it out of
17	assist you with this inquiry and personally give his	17	Grenfell.
18	account, and yet he was not permitted. He wanted to	18	Mr Bonifacio and Mr Bernard were good friends.
19	give you an oral account of his experience during the	19	Mr Bonifacio, Raymond and Marley would often go to the
20	fire and the efforts it took to rescue him. Indeed, his	20	bookies together or to the local pub. Mr Bonifacio, who
21	legal team compiled footage of the fire, showing the	21	survived, misses his friend Moses.
22	fire spread around flat 83, the impact of the ground	22	Sir, unfortunately, Grenfell Tower is now synonymous
23	monitoring in order to prevent the fire spread around	23	with lost lives, lost loves, lost opportunities.
24	his flat, and effectively preventing the fire spreading	24	So to the task at hand.
25	to flat 83, which we would have wished to present during	25	Sir, many of our clients have spent the last
	Page 37		Page 39
1	Mr Bonifacio's evidence as part of the record. To date,	1	18 months in temporary accommodation, battling with the
2	this has not happened.	2	authorities that have failed them. Nonetheless, they
3	We trust and can only hope that this evidence will	3	remain stoic and resolute in their quest for truth,
4	form part of the record of evidence relating to that	4	justice and accountability.
5	night in due course.	5	Sir, as you retire to contemplate the next stage of
6	Sir, do you know where Penal is?	6	these proceedings, there are many heart-wrenching
7	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: This is becoming a panel game!	7	stories of that night. For example, Nabil and
8	MR THOMAS: Let me tell you.	8	Malak Choucair, who lost six of their family members,
9	Penal is a small village in the south of Trinidad,	9	mother, sister, three nieces, Malak's brother, who was
10	on that twin Caribbean island state known as Trinidad	10	married to Nabil's sister, all trapped in the upper
11	and Tobago. It lies south of San Fernando and north of	11	floors of that tower.
12	the town of Siparia. It was originally a rice and	12	It's difficult to remain unmoved by Nabil's sheer
13	cocoa-producing area.	13	desperation and bravery that night. He begged, he
14	Raymond Herbert Bernard was born in Penal. Raymond,	14	pleaded, in desperate attempts to get inside
15	or Moses as he was known to close friends and family,	15	Grenfell Tower on the morning of 14 June, to get past
16	was one of seven children born to Rose Bernard, her	16	the police cordon, to make contact with his family
17	third child born on 22 May 1954. He had four sisters,	17	trapped inside that tower. He, too, was not offered the
18	two brothers, and he was a father of three, an uncle to	18	opportunity to give oral testimony before this inquiry,
19	many and admired by many.	19	which is a pity, because that would've been cathartic.
20	Raymond, who arrived in the UK in 1969 one of the	20	He was not placed at the heart of this inquiry. He
21	later Windrush generation attended Isaac Newton Boys'	21	really wanted to give oral evidence, yet his evidence
22	School in Ladbroke Grove, and went on to do his	22	was not called.
23	apprenticeship and become an electrical engineer when he	23	Yes, sir, there are many personal stories of that
24	was 16, and worked at the House of Lords.	24	fateful night, all painful, all raw, all heartbreaking.
25	Raymond loved reggae and soul, and in the early part	25	It's also important to note this, and recognise that
23	Tally mond to red reggae and sout, and in the early part		r
	Page 38		Page 40

1 initial assessment. 1 those of us who represent the bereaved, survivors and 2 relatives are not necessarily a homogeneous group who 2 Likewise, sir, the evidence of the helicopter pilots 3 engage with the process in the same way. Many engage in 3 is critical to our clients' understanding of the 4 this process in many different ways, sir. Also, at 4 response of the emergency responders and how their loved 5 5 times, they seek different outcomes. ones died. 6 Our client, Mr Choucair, who sits in front of you 6 The evidence is particularly important to the 7 7 Choucair family, the family of Raymond Bernard and the today, his position is -- and I say this on his 8 behalf -- that the following factors were responsible 8 family of Gloria Trevisan. It is imperative that the 9 9 for the death of his family members. He wishes to state Metropolitan Police control room operators who advised 10 that the government failed to safeguard the residents 10 Zainab Deen to wave at helicopters is called to answer 11 after major fires, including Lakanal, with more robust 11 questions relating to that advice given. 12 12 Building Regulations. He wishes to state decisions made Our clients are genuinely concerned that other 13 in relation to the insulation and the flammable cladding 13 residents who travelled from the floor to the roof were 14 is responsible. He wishes to state decisions made in 14 advised to do so by members of the emergency services in 15 relation to budget cuts in emergency services, fire 15 order to be rescued by helicopters. This concern is 16 services, the police, the ambulance. He wishes to state 16 corroborated by Farhad Neda's evidence that 17 decisions made in relation to the refurbishment works, 17 Mrs Afrasiabi, one of the Iranian ladies on the 18th 18 the decisions made in relation to rescue and evacuation, 18 floor, mentioned that they had been told that 19 the decision made to stop miscommunications and 19 helicopters would rescue them from the top. 20 information about rescue. 20 Farhad also recorded discussion about them going 21 I am merely his voice to you, sir. 21 onto the roof to be rescued by helicopters. Although 22 Let me continue. 22 Farhad didn't know the source of that information, it 23 23 Sir, although this inquiry has admitted the was apparent that that information had been received 24 statements from the Metropolitan Police Service and the 24 apparently in a phone call. Mrs Neda was also unclear 25 London Ambulance Service, witnesses who attended the 25 whether the advice to wait to be rescued by helicopters Page 41 Page 43 1 Grenfell Tower as part of the blue-light emergency 1 from the roof had come from firefighters. 2 response, into evidence, many of our clients have 2 Sir, our clients' own suspicions are that the 3 3 questions of these witnesses that can only properly be presence of the helicopters gave residents, particularly 4 4 those on the upper floors, a false hope that they would answered through oral evidence, which we detailed in our 5 written submissions to you on the emergency responders. 5 indeed be rescued, and that was shared by Farhad and 6 I trust in the next phase you'll take the opportunity to 6 other firefighters, as we've heard from Firefighter 7 consider those. 7 Alan Moore. 8 In particular, we had urged and continue to urge the 8 These concerns, sir, can only properly be allayed 9 9 from the testimony of the Metropolitan Police control inquiry to call the Metropolitan Police responders, 10 10 PC Sangha and PC Rees, to give oral evidence during the staff who took the calls from residents in the tower, 11 remaining section of Phase 1. Their unique perspective 11 and disclosure of the MPS's call handling guidance 12 protocols. is that of another emergency service with perhaps 12 13 13 a different culture than the London Fire Brigade. Their In addition to providing our clients with the 14 assessment of the incident shortly after arrival -- in 14 answers to these questions concerning their loved ones 15 15 particular, Sangha's assessment of the need for who died, this evidence is also necessary to identify 16 evacuation of the building at 01.28 -- was a critical 16 the advice given by the Metropolitan Police Service call 17 time when more lives could've been saved. 17 handlers to callers trapped in order to ensure that 18 We're mindful of Dr Barbara Lane's assessment that 18 lessons are learned from the Grenfell Tower fire. 19 stay put should have been abandoned at 01.26, and that 19 Society is well used to and trusting of advice given 20 safe evacuation of those physically able was possible up 20 over the telephone and, looking forward, online in our 21 until 01.40 or later, depending on variables such as the 21 interconnected world. To not properly examine this in 22 floor. It is therefore essential to know what 22 the light of the events on 14 June fails to take

discussions PC Rees had with the incident commander, if

at all, and whether there was a discussion about

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evacuation given the Metropolitan Police Service's

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an opportunity that may never come again, sir, and we

Martin Luther King Junior said this:

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ask you to consider that.

1 "Never, never be afraid to do what's right. 1 We say at this stage, sir, you can answer those 2 2 Society's punishments are small compared to the wounds auestions. 3 we inflict on our own souls when we look the other way." 3 When my corporate colleagues get to their feet to 4 Sir, we hope you do not look the other way. 4 address you after those of us representing the bereaved, 5 5 On 6 June, in my opening statement, I said on behalf survivors and relatives sit down, sir, please be aware 6 of G11: 6 of this: be wary of attempts to distract, divert, 7 7 re-write history or blame others in an attempt to "There has in the openings of others been criticisms 8 of the Fire Fighters' capabilities and their reactions 8 conceal the truth. 9 on the night, that is something that will undoubtedly be 9 Remember, sir, that although we have not yet heard 10 considered. However, we must not lose sight of the 10 all the evidence -- and we still have yet to hear the 11 primary issues." 11 evidence of Mr Ahmed, who sits before you, who was the 12 12 chair of the Leaseholders' Association -- remember, he I repeat that: let's not lose sight of the primary 13 13 asked Kensington and Chelsea to conduct a full health 14 14 and safety audit of Grenfell Tower. He delivered the Refurbishments, the works. 15 I also said on a previous occasion that when 72 15 dossier to Kensington and Chelsea two weeks before that 16 souls were lost in the most horrendous and awful way, 16 fire, and yet those steps were not taken. Don't forget 17 those responsible should hang their heads in collective 17 he repeatedly told the TMO to provide and carry out 18 shame. Having heard six months of evidence, there is 18 a fire drill, queried the absence of any fire safety 19 nothing to make me alter my view about those sentiments. 19 advice for the residents of Grenfell. 20 The fact that mass fatalities, mass personal both 20 This disaster happened because ordinary people were 21 physical and psychological injury and mass homelessness 21 ignored. It is a direct consequence of that failing. 22 of innocent residential dwellers is, quite frankly, 22 Sir, we've now had the pleasure of your company for 23 23 outrageous. The fact that it was caused in this way is the best part of, what, nearly seven months? And having 24 just shocking. Those scars are wounds which are just as 24 seen the way that this hearing has been conducted, how 25 25 your inquiry team have operated and how the other core raw today. Page 45 Page 47 1 Previously, we said that there are many important 1 participants have conducted themselves, what we can 2 questions that needed to be asked. Sir, some of those 2 agree on, as night must surely follow day, is you're not 3 questions have been answered. But there are still many 3 going to please everyone. There simply has not been 4 more questions which will be left for the next phase of 4 consistency in the demands made of you. 5 your inquiry. 5 It is clear from the written submissions of the core The fact remains that -- and this cannot be avoided, 6 participants that you cannot take a sword of Solomon 6 7 sir -- once a reasonably safe block was turned into 7 approach to this tragedy that engulfed this residential 8 8 a deathtrap -- and I echo but do not repeat the block back in June 2017, split it down the middle and 9 q submissions made by some of my other colleagues who have dispense justice to satisfy all. It ain't going to 10 10 come before me -- sir, I previously said that whilst happen in that way. In fact, the evidence simply does 11 not permit you to do that. It simply does not fall in 11 those responsible for the refurbishment may dispute just 12 how unsafe they made Grenfell Tower, it is 12 that way. 13 incontrovertible that the tower was intentionally 13 Sir, as I got to my feet, you probably thought, 14 14 "What's that Leslie Thomas going to say today? What's rendered significantly less safe by the introduction of 15 highly flammable material to its structure and exterior. 15 he going to complain about this time on behalf of G11?" We stand by those remarks. 16 It is true that, during this inquiry, there have 16 17 It is clear now that this fact wasn't communicated 17 been certain themes to the requests that I have made of 18 my clients. But, in fairness to me, I have to do my 18 to the London Fire Brigade. The fire safety of several 19 best to hold this inquiry to account and I have to do it 19 hundred people deliberately compromised in their own 20 fearlessly. 20 homes, and yet public servants ultimately responsible 21 for protecting them in the event of a fire were simply 21 Sir, you know and you appreciate that those demands 22 have only been made with good intention, trying to 22 never told, still less consulted. 23 assist you and your team in this traumatic process for 23 Sir, key questions in Grenfell. 24 those I represent, and I honestly hope that the requests 24 How on earth did this happen? What went so 25 were made with respect, politely and with the right tone 25 tragically wrong? Why is it that so many people died? Page 46 Page 48

1 1 and sense of humour. best efforts to fit in with your timetabling around 2 Sir, from the perspective of the people who have 2 their daily commitments -- school runs, childcare 3 been ignored for so long at their personal cost, that 3 arrangements, hospital appointments -- and, sir, all we 4 they feel the need to make complaints -- and, yes, they 4 ask is, if you can, more advance notice of time changes, 5 5 haven't been happy with all aspects of this process. that would be greatly appreciated. 6 Just by way of example, the way that some of the 6 Disclosure, or sometimes the lack of it, or 7 7 questions have been put, the lack of opportunity to put sometimes the fact that it comes late. 8 questions through their own counsel, having sufficient 8 An example of late disclosure would be the 9 9 time to take instructions in between the questioning of helicopter footage which represented the visual image of 10 witnesses. Sir, as we move from this phase to Phase 1B 10 the fire spread which actually located people on various 11 and Phase 2, we submit that it is necessary that our 11 floors. One example, sir, there were images of persons 12 12 clients' questions are asked as questions through their in flat 193, the Choucair family home, which were seen 13 own counsel. 13 in the footage between 2.00 am and 3.00 am. 14 14 Sir, as a result of that late disclosure of that As you and your council will well appreciate, your 15 team will have to take a very neutral role in the next 15 helicopter footage, received on 21 September, and the 16 phases of this hearing. Some may argue -- we certainly 16 NPAS pilot statements received on 28 September, our 17 do argue -- that they're not properly or best placed to 17 clients were unable to ask critical questions of 18 ask the searching and robust questionings that our 18 witnesses from the control room. Just to give you three 19 clients need to be asked. 19 examples, the control room operators Sharon Darby, who 20 The venue and its lack of suitability. 20 gave evidence on 1 and 2 August; Peter Duddy, who gave 21 You may not know this, sir, but one of my clients, 21 evidence on 13 September; and the control room manager, 22 Cordelia Disson, the widow of Anthony Disson, Tony 22 Jo Smith, who recommended the abandonment of stay put. 23 23 Disson, and other members of the Disson family are among Additionally, sir, our clients wanted to ask the 24 the clients who would have wished to attend these 24 CROs and the senior fire officers in the control room 25 25 hearings more frequently. But, unfortunately, they've questions about the advice given and the change of the Page 49 Page 51 1 been unable to travel to central London. Mrs Disson 1 stay put with the use of images. These images would've 2 suffers from panic attacks and has difficulty travelling 2 been relevant to questions asked of Mr Dowden. It was 3 on public transport. In addition, sir, we have several 3 a missed opportunity. 4 clients who have been diagnosed with PTSD as a result of 4 Sir, I now come to the issue of diversity -- or 5 this incident, which makes travelling to this inquiry 5 I should say lack of it. 6 extremely difficult, particularly in rush hour. 6 Sir, when is the diversity panel going to be in 7 Like many other clients, Mrs Disson considers the 7 place? It's now almost some seven months since the 8 8 Prime Minister's decision on 10 May 2018 for the layout of this courtroom ill-suited for their needs. 9 9 Sir, you will remember days when particular witnesses -appointment of a panel to sit with you. We've 10 10 for example, Dany Cotton when she was giving her repeatedly called for the urgent appointment of 11 evidence -- this room was filled to capacity and, at 11 a diverse panel and expected -- those expectations may 12 times, during breaks people had to swap places. 12 have been false -- that that panel would've been 13 Start times. 13 appointed before the autumn to hear the evidence of the 14 A small request as we move forward. Sir, can we 14 bereaved, survivors and relatives and the experts. 15 please stick to the agreed start times? I know it's 15 Well, that didn't happen. 16 difficult, but we have said and we did announce 16 Sir, we respectfully ask you to urgently appoint 17 10 o'clock, and we did say that we would aim to finish 17 that diverse panel before the end of 2018 or, at the 18 by 4 o'clock. We've counted them: on 23 occasions, sir, 18 very latest, the start of 2019. 19 we've started at 9.30. 19 We say that for the following reasons. 20 Now, don't get me wrong, we fully understand that 20 We would ask that the remit of the panel includes 21 there are times, because of the pressure on the 21 the review of the evidence already heard and received into the record, and that you sit with the panel for the 22 evidence, we need to get through the evidence. We get 22 23 that, we understand that. Whilst we as lawyers 23 remaining of the evidence of Phase 1 relating to those 24 understand that and fully appreciate the inquiry's case 24 who died and who had near death experiences in the 25 management duties, our clients are trying to make the 25 discharge of the article 2 function. This is a matter Page 50 Page 52

of concern for our clients and, indeed, the general	1 Non-compliance with Building Regulations.
2 public.	What we say, respectfully, you need to be careful
3 Having a voice in this inquiry.	of, and now, is the fact that there may well be attempts
4 There has been struggle at times for our clients to	4 to divert and distract the reaching of necessary
5 be heard in this inquiry. In the face of great	5 conclusions to the end of Phase 1; namely, clear and
6 adversity and the challenges of our clients, some of	6 unambiguous evidence given by the experts which has been
7 whom are grief-stricken with the personal loss of their	7 so vividly backed up by the survivors and firefighters.
8 loved ones, they continue to suffer mental anguish and	8 We say, sir, that this tragedy was caused because
9 post-traumatic stress, yet many of them struggle to get	9 the tower failed, and that failure was massive and
10 here.	10 systemic. We know that because, in clear and stark
As you move onto the next phase, can we make another	11 terms, your experts have said so.
12 small ask, and it's this: a sickness protocol for	12 The tower failed for the following reasons, and,
absentee witnesses. What we mean by that is this: sir,	sir, I'm not going to repeat in any great detail what
as you move into Phase 1B and Phase 2, dealing with the	you've heard already, I'm just going to highlight some
15 movements of those who died or had near death	bullet points for you.
experiences, we would ask you to create or adopt	16 Firstly, overarching of all the failures was the
a protocol in relation to witnesses not being called on	decision to wrap this building in flammable material,
18 medical grounds. We raise this and use two examples,	the cladding system, including the repositioning and
19 Peter May and Graham Winch, both witnesses who were	19 insulating of the windows. It was so dangerous it meant that a multiple compartment fire became inevitable.
20 excused on medical grounds. The inquiry excused	1
21 Mr Winch for medical reasons, and we felt initially that	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
22 that was done without providing sufficient detail.	,
23 I'm sure there was good reason. But, sir, it's just 24 the question of involving all so we know. We, as our	1
	24 not comply with Building Regulations. 25 Sir, we say and we say that you're empowered to
25 clients, are concerned that in the absence of a proper	25 Sif, we say and we say that you're empowered to
Page 53	Page 55
1 protocol requiring clear medical evidence where	do this that the cladding system was the primary
2 a witness is to be excused on medical grounds, our	2 cause of the fire that spread so significantly that it
3 clients are concerned and these are not unfounded	3 meant that, in Grenfell, stay put was no longer viable.
4 concerns that there may be a risk that witnesses may	4 Secondly, the works to install the cladding system
5 try to rely on illness as a way of avoiding giving	5 undoubtedly made the tower less safe than it was
6 evidence. What you need to do, sir, is allay those	6 beforehand.
7 concerns, and those concerns can be allayed with	7 Sir, as Dr Lane said, this tower should not have
8 a protocol that everybody understands.	8 been occupied at all. Worse still, it seems that no one
9 Sir, now, the good news.	9 grappled with that fact at the time. Just as they are
10 Sir, I'm not here to remind you of any of those	doing now, all the people involved seemed to be
11 matters that I just mentioned. You may be wondering why	11 convincing themselves that it was somebody else's job to
12 I'm on my feet. Well, let's put aside those asks. I'm	put safety before profit. We say, sir: don't accept
not here to complain about process today. What I am	that excuse, that defence, "Not me, guv, someone else."
14 here to say to you is and you may well be thinking,	14 Sir, never has there been a truer saying than: more
15 "Has Mr Thomas suddenly been disabled with that dreaded	people would learn from their mistakes if they weren't
16 Michaelmas 'festivetightus goodwillius'?", that commonly	so busy denying them.
17 known Latin disease that hits people at this time of the	The facts in front of our eyes are stark and
18 year I know you and your team have a lot of work to	obvious, and we know that this inquiry will not shirk
do, and you're probably going to have a very short break	19 from them. Nothing less than a clear finding of
20 before you start that work, because there is much work	20 non-compliance with the Building Regulations will do.
21 for you and your team to do at this stage of the	21 And, sir, we know you know that.
22 proceedings.	22 Let me move on, sir.
No, today is a day not to complain. Today is a day	23 Sir, the responsible parties have had ample
to let you know our thoughts on how you go forward, and	opportunity, yet none of them have sought to advance
25 that's what I propose to do now.	a positive case as to why the work to install the
Page 54	Page 56

2 accept that such a view would be untenshib. Others are content to explain why others, not them, are responsible. This is why the cires of unfairness by some of the corporate participants are misguided and are not not an analogous to the ones mude by my clients in Phase 1.  7 Because in Phase 1, sir, we're not looking at blame.  8 This is not about blame at this stage. But it's about the story as to what happened on the night, and which is why we say there's a disnicinch brevene their right to participate, and that right is properly protected.  12 So, sir, we will argue about who was responsible for that state of affairs in Phase 2. That will come. But that state of affairs in Phase 2. That will come. But violation of the law. That much demands the immediate recognition by this inquiry. The time for action is now, not in a year or in two years time.  24 So, sir, the reasons are see tout in detail in our written submissions. I urge you to look at the submissions of GI1, along with G4 and G3 to assist, to Genefiell Tower were not compliant.  25 Can I just trach-upon a few other failures of the words, the cladding system min and make in more day of the stage of the fire building should not have been occupied even if all active and passive fire protection measures in the tower were fully compliant and in working order. In other words with stay put and unlawful.  Even if, for example, the fire doors and smoke extractor system were compliant, the fire lift worked and the right to opposite to mitigate the pop of fire that those makes and of the possible to mitigate the pop of fire that those makes and the repair of the corporation of the right may and the might, and so the cladding was not the only reason why the word was a dealthrap.  2 The lifts failed to perform effectively, hindering the transportation of thereighting equipment, creating and unlawful.  2 The tower's dry riser was non-compliant with the				
content to explain why others, not them, are responsible. This is why the crites of unfairness by some of the corporate participants are misguided and are not analogous to the ones made by my clients in Phase 1. Because in Phase 1, is, we've not looking at blame. This is not about blame at this stage. But it's about the experiences my clients have had, which is central to the story as to what happened on the night, and which is why we say there's a distinction between their right to participate, and that right is properly protected. So, sir, we will argue about who was responsible for the state of affairs in Phase 2. That will come. But the state of affairs in Phase 2. That will come. But the state of affairs in Phase 2. That will come. But the state of affairs in Phase 2. That will come. But the state of affairs in two years time. So, sir, we mild ague about who was responsible for the state of affairs in two years time. So, sir, the reasons are set out in detail in our to now, not in a year or in two years time. So, sir, the reasons are set out in detail in our declare that the refurbishment works done to works, the cladding system in atems  Dage 57  I building and I hope to do so very quickly. Importantly, Dr. Lance confirmed that, in her opinion, the building should not have been occupied even if all a citive and passive fire protection measures in the tower works, the cladding system made the design incompatible with stay put and unlard in working order. In other words, the cladding system in a terms  Dage 57  I building and I hope to do so very quickly. Importantly, Dr. Lance confirmed that, in her opinion, the building should not have been occupied even if all a citive and passive fire protection measures in the tower works, the cladding system made the design incompatible with stay	1	cladding system was compliant. Indeed, some appear to	1	standards of the time of construction and non-compliant
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Page 57  Page 59  Degree 59  Page 59  Page 59  Degree 50  Degree 60  Degree 50  Degree 60  Degree 50  Degree 60  Degree 6	24	Grenfell Tower were not compliant.	24	made of the Fire Brigade and the advice they gave to
building and I hope to do so very quickly.  Importantly, Dr Lane confirmed that, in her opinion, the building should not have been occupied even if all active and passive fire protection measures in the tower were fully compliant and in working order. In other words, the cladding system made the design incompatible with stay put and unlawful.  Even if, for example, the fire doors and smoke extractor system were compliant, the fire lift worked and the wet riser present, in her view it was simply not materials would cause. Of course, unfortunately, those the night, and so the cladding was not the only reason why the tower was a deathtrap.  The facts are, sir, that the fire doors to the entrances of 120 flats had been replaced in 2011 and did not comply with fire safety standards.  There's only one stairwell. This was the only  Even if, for example. This was the only escape route, which was smoke-filled as a result of the fire.  In dangerous and stay put was still working, they would not have had to rely on the Fire Brigade at all, save for, thave had to rely on the Fire Brigade at all, save for, thave had to rely on the Fire Brigade at all, save for, thave had to rely on the Fire out in flat 16. As Dr Lane confirmed, that is the foundation of a stay-put policy.  Although Dr Lane does not go so far as to state that the internal firefighting was fundamentally incompatible with simultaneous evacuation in the tower, it is clear that the spread of fire and smoke would have posed extractor system were compliant, the fire lift worked serious threats to the health and safety of residents and the wet riser present, in her view it was simply not and significant obstacles to effective firefighting in any event. For example, it is telling that Dr Lane believes stair doors being kept open during firefighting activities was the most likely cause of the "hot zone" on the mid-floors, which so obstructed escape and rescue.  The Civil Contingencies Act.  The Civil Contingencies Act.  The Civil Contingencies Act, and others the tra	25	Can I just touch upon a few other failures of the	25	occupants, if the building had not been made so
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	25	The tower's dry riser was non-compliant with the	25	didn't communicate their assessment of the need to
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1	evacuate the building at 1.26 am and did not communicate
2	its declaration of a major incident. The LAS were slow
3	in their co-ordination of their response and
4	communication with the London Fire Brigade incident
5	commander. And the Royal Borough of Kensington and
6	Chelsea well, they really never got off the mark.
7	The plans of the building didn't arrive until after
8	7.30, after repeated pleas by Andy Roe. And, again,
9	it's incontrovertible that there wasn't really real
10	co-ordination of responses, certainly in the first two
11	hours.
12	Where we pick up the baton, still untouched on this
13	issue, are the lessons to be learned to ensure that the
14	provisions of the Civil Contingencies Act are complied
15	with by blue-light responders to a major incident.
16	Training.
17	It is palpably clear, sir, from the evidence of
18	Thatcher that he had received limited training on the
19	application of JESIP, and of course the natural
20	conclusion affected his and the other MPS response.
21	Although we've not explored the impact which the
22	inadequate training had on the provisions of the Civil
23	Contingencies Act or JESIP, we say it contributed to the
24	inadequacy and lack of co-ordination of the response of
25	the emergency services in Phase 1. It is clearly
	,
	Page 61
1	relevant sin to the manager of the assessment
1	relevant, sir, to the response of the emergency
2	services, and we would therefore invite this inquiry to
3	examine that issue in Phase 2.
4	Sir, when the Prime Minister announced you as chair of this inquiry on 20 June 2017, she expressed
5	of this inquiry on 29 June 2017, she expressed
6	a commitment to unearthing the truth and leaving no
7	stone unturned. She vowed that there would be justice
8	for all the victims of this terrible tragedy and for
9	their families who have suffered so terribly.
10	The Grenfell community, though, is still coming to
11	terms with their painful loss. They've engaged in this
12	consultation, they've attended community meetings,
13	they've made submissions on the scope and terms of this
14	inquiry and they've become many core participants.
15	So what does it mean that there will be justice for
16	all the victims?
17	It can mean one thing and one thing only: that you
18	and your team will do the right thing. And the question
19	is: when? When will you do the right thing?
20	Well, I say the time is at this stage because, as
21	Martin Luther King would say, "It is always the right
22	time to do the right thing."
23	Thank you, sir.
24	SIR MARTIN MOORE-BICK: Well, thank you very much,
25	Mr Thomas.
	Decc (2)
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